

WHITE PAPER

Correcting False Claims about the New False Claims Act Legislation

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Never stir up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this. Who can be more nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls the register of deeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up strife, and put money in his pocket?

—Abraham Lincoln¹

Invoking the name and legacy of Abraham Lincoln—who in 1863 championed the adoption of the original federal False Claims Act (FCA) to stop fraudulent military suppliers in the Civil War—supporters of the False Claims Act Corrections Act² claimed in 2007 that it would fix the “problems” that had allegedly arisen in the way the federal courts interpret the existing act. But S. 386, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which contains in Section Four the 111th Congress’ version of “clarifications” to the False Claims Act,³

destroys the balance in the FCA between protecting federal taxpayer funds while not encouraging abusive and profiteering litigation. S. 386 would unnecessarily expand the ability of individuals acting as private attorneys general (so-called *qui tam* plaintiffs⁴) to sue defendants, supposedly on behalf of the government, who have allegedly submitted false claims for money or property. It turns the FCA from a statute protecting the government against fraud to “an all-purpose anti-fraud statute.”⁵ By losing track of the FCA’s original purpose of assisting the work of federal officials in safeguarding and recovering funds belonging to the federal treasury, S. 386 ignores Lincoln’s own philosophy on the practice of law and his admonition to other lawyers: Avoid needless litigation.

From start to finish, the new bill would reduce the primacy in FCA litigation of government pro-

1. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, July 1, 1850, available at <http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/lawlect.htm>.
2. The legislation’s supporters were at that time addressing S. 2041, the then-pending version of the False Claims Act Corrections Act. 110th Cong. (2008) (as reported by Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 3, 2008). A closely related measure was introduced in the House on December 12, 2007 by Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.). False Claims Act Corrections Act of 2007, H.R. 4854, 110th Cong. (2007). The primary sponsor of S. 386 in the 111th Congress is Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), and Representative Berman sponsored the related House measure, H.R. 1788.
3. S. 386 was passed by the Senate on a vote of 92-4 on April 28, 2009, and an amended version was passed by the House of Representatives on a vote of 367-59 on May 6, 2009, so the different versions would have to be reconciled before the measure may be enacted into law. See Congressional Record pages S4765-4766 and H5260-5272.

4. “Qui tam” is from a Latin phrase meaning “he who brings a case on behalf of our lord the King, as well as for himself.” See False Claims Act Cases: Government Intervention in Qui Tam (Whistleblower) Suits, U.S. Department of Justice, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf.
5. See *Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders*, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 (2008) (FCA prohibition on using a false record to induce government payment requires that a defendant intend that the government itself pay the claim, rather than just showing that a false statement resulted in the use of government funds to pay a claim).

ecutors, investigators, and other disinterested professionals working in the public interest. It would manufacture needless litigation brought by private plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers who are enticed by prospects of striking it rich through FCA lawsuits, not protecting the American taxpayer. Contrary to its supporters' assertions that all of the changes to the FCA are either "narrowly tailored" or merely "technical and correcting amendments,"⁶ the bill would greatly expand the ability of individuals to bring and pursue such suits, without government involvement or oversight, against private entities only tangentially related to the public interest. In addition to reversing a unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court interpreting the FCA, the bill would:

1. Increase the number of lawsuits and potential targets of such lawsuits by allowing punitive FCA actions to be brought against private entities—such as hospitals, universities, and other non-governmental organizations—for private, non-government money, just because they have received unrelated federal funds.
2. Unfairly permit the government to assert claims that would otherwise be time-barred by effectively tolling the statute of limitations by relating back the government's intervention to the date of the original *qui tam* complaint, undermining the ability of a defendant to defend himself.
3. Greatly increase the number of individuals and organizations that can bring secondary lawsuits (as well as the number of individuals who may be made defendants in those lawsuits) claiming that they were retaliated or discriminated against even if they took no steps to actually bring an FCA lawsuit.
4. Allow the Justice Department to provide information obtained through law enforcement investigations to private parties to use against other private parties.

If nothing else, the bill illustrates how the powerful trial lawyers and their lobbyists influence Washington in their hunt for easy lawsuits generating big money. Fortune Magazine ranked the Association of

6. Statements of Sen. Grassley and Sen. Durbin on the introduction of S. 2041, False Claims Act Corrections Act of 2007 (Sep. 12, 2007), available at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=110-s20070912-34&bill=s110-2041> (last visited May 18, 2009).

Trial Lawyers of America, which changed its name to the American Association for Justice ("AAJ"), fifth on its list of the most powerful lobbying groups and identified the trial lawyers as one of the three lobbying groups in Fortune's top ten that "owe[d] their high rankings to their substantial campaign contributions."⁷ Since that time, the power and influence that lobbyists for trial lawyers and other attorneys wield in Washington has greatly increased, for they contributed more than \$232 million to candidates in the 2007-2008 election cycle, over 75% to Democrats, making them the top ranking industry group in total contributions.⁸ AAJ's political arm alone ranked 14th in contributions to political campaigns in 2008.⁹

As a result of FCA lawsuits, from 1987 to 2008 the federal government was awarded \$21.6 billion. *Private* attorneys general (*qui tam* plaintiffs) took home \$2.2 billion.¹⁰ S. 386 is tailor-made to ensure that plaintiffs, their lawyers, and members of the AAJ receive even greater FCA paydays in the future at the expense of individuals, private businesses, and charitable organizations.

Current Law

The False Claims Act applies to every company, foundation, other organization, or individual who receives from or pays money to the federal government. It imposes civil liability and stiff penalties on anyone who knowingly uses a "false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government."¹¹ It also imposes liability on any person who "conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim

7. See "Washington's Power 25: Which Pressure Groups Are Best at Manipulating the Laws We Live By?" *Fortune*, Dec. 8, 1997, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1997/12/08/234927/index.htm.

8. Center for Responsive Politics, 2008 Overview, Top Industries, available at <http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/industries.php>.

9. David Ingram, "Plaintiffs Bar Pushes Hill Agenda," *Legal Times*, March 30, 2009.

10. Fraud Statistics—Overview, October 1, 1986—September 30, 2008, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice; available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/fraud-statistics1986-2008.htm>.

11. 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(2).

allowed or paid.”¹² Over 99 percent of FCA cases end up settling before trial “because of the enormously punitive nature of the FCA.”¹³ Anyone held liable is penalized between \$5,500 and \$11,000 for each false claim¹⁴ plus treble damages—i.e., “3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains” because of the false claim.¹⁵

If a court finds a single statement on which a contractor’s primary agreement with the government was based to be false or fraudulent, all claims submitted under the contract can be considered false claims. The damages awarded can be as much as three times the amount of every dollar the government paid the contractor under the contract. Each and every request for payment—whether invoice, regular bill, or even expense request—under the contract will incur an additional penalty of \$5,500 to \$11,000.¹⁶

The Justice Department may pursue false claims itself, or any person may hire a plaintiff’s lawyer and bring a *qui tam* suit under the FCA. The theory underlying *qui tam* suits is that private citizens are often in a better position to know of fraud than are the government officials responsible for assessing claims. Wrongdoers thus are more likely to be punished, the theory goes, and the losses are more likely to be recovered and repaid to the federal treasury, if individuals are given a financial incentive to uncover the false claims.

Private *qui tam* plaintiffs (or “relators” under the FCA) must serve the Department of Justice with any FCA suit they file and must also provide a “written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses.”¹⁷ Upon notifica-

tion, the Department has 60 days (which is typically extended) to assess the merits of the case and determine whether it will intervene and conduct the lawsuit itself.¹⁸ If the government declines to intervene, the plaintiff and his lawyer may conduct the case themselves. The Justice Department intervenes in less than 25 percent of *qui tam* lawsuits.¹⁹

Qui tam plaintiffs are rewarded handsomely. Even if the government intervenes, takes responsibility for prosecuting the lawsuit, and incurs all costs and expenses, a *qui tam* plaintiff receives up to 25 percent of the total damages awarded. If the government declines the case, the *qui tam* plaintiff receives up to 30 percent. The remainder goes to the U.S. treasury. In either case, the plaintiff will also receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.²⁰ Yet trial lawyers often agree to take FCA cases on a contingency basis in exchange for a percentage of the money awarded to the *qui tam* plaintiff, meaning that *qui tam* plaintiffs are freed from having to pay any attorney’s fees unless and until they have won the money to do so.

Expanding Liability to False Claims for Money Belonging to Private Parties

For the past 146 years, in order for a plaintiff to maintain a False Claims Act suit, the allegedly false claim must have been made to obtain federal money. This makes good sense since it keeps the FCA from becoming a general purpose anti-fraud statute. The objective of the FCA has always been to protect the public fisc—i.e., taxpayer funds in the U.S. treasury. If the allegedly false claim is not for federal funds, there is no federal interest for the FCA to vindicate. The intent of Congress in the FCA was “to protect the Government from loss due to fraud” while ensuring that “a defendant is not answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary, and reasonable consequences of his conduct.”²¹

12. 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(3).

13. John T. Boese and Michael J. Anstett, “Dramatic Changes to the False Claims Act Are No Laughing Matter,” The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, February 2009.

14. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(9) (increasing the statutory minimum from \$5,000 to \$5,500 and the maximum from \$10,000 to \$11,000 to adjust for inflation).

15. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.

16. *See, e.g., United States v. Krizek*, 111 F.3d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (counting each instance in which a doctor used a later-invalidated billing method as a separate False Claims Act offense punishable by the statutory monetary penalty); *United States v. Ehrlich*, 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1981) (counting each of 76 monthly vouchers submitted by a builder as a separate False Claims Act offense punishable by the statutory monetary penalty).

17. 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(2). The complaint is “filed in

camera” and remains “under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.” Thus, defendants receive no notice of a claim until and unless the court unseals the complaint. *Id.*

18. 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(2).

19. “False Claims Act Cases: Government Intervention in Qui Tam (Whistleblower) Suits,” U.S. Department of Justice, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/Documents/fcprocess2.pdf.

20. 31 U.S.C. §3730(d).

21. *Allison Engine*, 128 S. Ct. at 2130 (citing *Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.*, 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006)).

A false invoice or false bill for goods of services is the “paradigmatic example of a false claim under the FCA,” but the term *false claim* “applies more generally to other demands for government funds.”²² But in all cases, the claim must have been made with the purpose and effect of extracting funds *from the government*.²³ Accordingly, the kinds of things the defendant must have done in order for an FCA lawsuit to be maintained under current law include:

- Presenting a false or fraudulent claim to an officer or employee of the United States for payment or approval (the so-called presentment requirement).
- Knowingly making or using a false record or statement “to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved” *by the federal government*.
- Conspiring to defraud the federal government “by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.”²⁴

False claims between private parties, by contrast, have for centuries been remedied by civil actions between the parties under state contract and tort law.

As the unanimous Supreme Court said just last year in *Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders*, it is not sufficient under the FCA for a plaintiff to show merely that a false statement resulted in getting payment of a claim or that government money was used to pay it. Instead, a plaintiff “must prove that the defendant *intended* that the false record or statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim.”²⁵ A defendant “must *intend* that the Government itself pay the claim,” not just that the false claim may have been paid using government funds.²⁶ In other words, the Supreme Court held that it is not enough to show that a fraud scheme had “the effect of causing a private entity to make payments using money obtained from the Government. Instead, it must be shown that the conspirators intended ‘to defraud the Gov-

ernment.’” Under any other circumstances, “the direct link between the false statement and Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too attenuated to establish liability.”²⁷

Section Four of S. 386 would reverse the *Allison Engine* holding and virtually eliminate the FCA’s requirement that a direct connection exist between the false claim and government money.²⁸ The bill as passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate eliminates the requirement in the first two provisions of the FCA that false claims be used “to get” payment from “the government.” These provisions would instead subject to liability any person who:

- (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; or
- (B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.

Both the House and Senate bills expand the definition of a “claim” to mean “any request or demand...for money or property and [sic] *whether or not the United States has title to the money or property*.”²⁹ Some have argued that including the requirement that, in order to be actionable, any false record or statement must be “material” to a false or fraudulent claim will limit the ability of *qui tam* plaintiffs to receive FCA awards for claims that have only an attenuated or tangential connection to

22. *United States v. Rivera*, 55 F.3d 705, 709 (1st Cir. 1995).

23. See *Allison Engine*, 128 S. Ct. at 2126; *United States v. Neifert-White Co.*, 390 U.S. 228, 230 (1968).

24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Other grounds for maintaining an FCA suit include delivering to the federal government “less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate of payment” or using a false statement or document to undermine a financial obligation to the federal government. *Id.*

25. *Allison Engine*, 128 S. Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added).

26. *Id.* at 2128 (emphasis added).

27. *Id.* at 2130.

28. Illustrating just how far the trial lawyers lobby would like to expand the FCA litigation industry, the original version of the False Claims Act Corrections Act would have made any false claim presented to anyone who receives any federal funds actionable under the FCA. See S. 2041, 110th Cong. § 2(1) (2007) (as introduced in Senate on Sept. 12, 2007). Thus, if a plumber, painter, or other small contractor submitted an allegedly false claim for payment to anyone who earns a federal salary or anyone who receives any federal subsidy or Social Security payment, that contractor could have been the target of an FCA suit by a *qui tam* plaintiff. The current version closes this particular avenue for litigation by including a narrow exception for “compensation for federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s use of the money or property.” S. 386, Sec. 4(b)(2)(B).

29. S. 386, Sec. 4(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In non-legal terms, a legislative provision stating that it makes no difference whether the United States “has title to” something is not much different than stating that it makes no difference whether the United States owns it.

federal funds. But the term “material” would only mean “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property,” an extremely weak and almost meaningless materiality requirement.³⁰

All that would be required under S. 386 is for the party who receives an allegedly false claim to have also received (or expect to receive) federal funds to pay some portion of the claim if the funds are to be spent on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest. Arguably under S. 386, even undesignated federal funds given to a general operating account would suffice. As the Supreme Court warned in the *Allison Engine* decision, this will expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating fraud against the Government into a general all-purpose anti-fraud statute. Under this amendment, allegedly false claims made to a 501(c)(3) organization that receives grants from federal employees’ charitable donations could expose the claimant to an FCA suit. Or “liability could attach for any false claim made to any college or university, so long as the institution has received some federal grants—as most of them do.”³¹

This one major change will transform the FCA into an essentially different law altogether. If a private hospital, university, or contractor doing business with the government receives a false or fraudulent claim for other, unrelated products or services, that private entity already has existing rights under state contract and tort law. Private parties have used the state and federal courts to vindicate those rights for centuries. However, S. 386 would reshape the existing provisions of the FCA into a general federal law on fraud, even in cases where the real federal interest at stake—if any—is only tenuously related to the false claim. The bill over-federalizes claims historically and adequately addressed at the state level and will allow the FCA to be used to advance claims against any private organizations and corporations that receive federal funds. It opens up huge swaths of the economy to FCA litigation, especially in today’s post-TARP (the federal Troubled Asset Relief Program), post-bailout, post-“stimulus” world where federal funds are being injected even into large private institutions that do not want them.

Using the Law Enforcement Power of the Justice Department to Benefit Private Parties

In order to give the government the ability to investigate a possible fraud, the FCA currently provides the Attorney General with the ability to serve a “civil investigative demand” on anyone who “may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or information relevant to a false claims law investigation.”³² The Attorney General cannot delegate this law enforcement authority, and the information and documentation obtained cannot be shared with *qui tam* plaintiffs and their counsel unless “consent is given by the person from whom the discovery was obtained.”³³

However, an amendment approved by the House of Representatives to S. 386 would give the Attorney General the authority to delegate this law enforcement investigative power and to share any information obtained “with any *qui tam* relator.”³⁴ This plaintiff-friendly amendment would allow the Attorney General or his designee within the Justice Department to give private individuals documents and information obtained using the law enforcement authority of the federal government. The amendment would place the U.S. government into the position of helping one private party in litigation against another, instead of conducting its own objective, impartial investigation to try to ascertain the truth of whether a violation of the law actually occurred.

The potential reward for a successful *qui tam* claim is enormous; the incentive for private plaintiffs is not to investigate impartially whether a fraud actually occurred, but to win a case at all costs. This amendment eliminates a sensible safeguard against frivolous litigation and the misuse of governmental power by private individuals to abuse the due process rights of other private citizens. Moreover, this provision turns the *qui tam* mechanism on its head—the justification for generous payoffs to *qui tam* plaintiffs is that they bring information about fraud to the government. There is simply no reason for the government to give information to plaintiffs so that they can prosecute *qui tam* suits they would otherwise lack the knowledge to bring.

30. S. 386, Sec. 4(a).

31. *Allison Engine Co.* at 2128 (citing *United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.*, 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 544 U.S. 1032 (2005)).

32. 31 U.S.C. § 3733.

33. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(i)(2).

34. S. 386, Sec. 4 (c).

Multiplying the Number of FCA “Retaliation” Lawsuits

The FCA as currently in force provides protection for a plaintiff who is discriminated against by his employer for pursuing an FCA *qui tam* suit. If the *qui tam* plaintiff’s employer allegedly discriminates against him in the workplace, he may bring a separate suit for reinstatement to his same position at the same pay grade, double the amount of back pay, and interest. He may also be awarded his litigation costs and his attorney’s fees. Although he may sue his employer, under the FCA he may not sue his individual supervisors or co-workers, nor may he sue any third party.

S. 386 as amended in the House of Representatives would open up numerous additional lawsuits by allowing non-employees—including subcontractors, independent contractors, and other agents—to sue for retaliation but without requiring the acts to be taken by an “employer.”³⁵ Contractors already have rights to sue for any breaches of or tortious interference with their contractual rights that are due to their lawfully pursuing *qui tam* suits. However, this amendment would expand liability to a broad range of circumstances that do not involve employment relationships. It is unnecessary to open up this additional avenue for suing under the FCA other than to give contractors and others an incentive to bring FCA lawsuits in federal courts that offer the potential for a monetary windfall of double the amount of alleged damages rather than state contractual or tort actions. If the current version of S. 386 is enacted into law, the litigation industry with all of its associated costs to U.S. society will expand substantially.

Additionally, supervisors and fellow employees would no longer be protected from becoming a defendant in an FCA retaliation lawsuit. Any person who “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against” the plaintiff could now be sued. This would be a tremendous disincentive to other employees or contractors coming forth to correct false allegations being made by a plaintiff in a *qui tam* suit since it would open them up to potential liability and litigation. Further, an unscrupulous plaintiff or plaintiff’s lawyer could simply add as defendants in any retali-

ation suit any individual with significant knowledge of the facts who might otherwise testify on behalf of the defendant in the *qui tam* suit. This would provide significant leverage to influence, intimidate, and coerce those individuals to “cooperate” with the *qui tam* plaintiff and his lawyers.

Effectively Tolling the Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for FCA claims is already quite generous. Unlike state civil fraud actions which typically must be brought between 3 and 5 years after the fraud is committed or 2 to 3 years after the facts of a hidden fraud are discovered, the FCA currently and prudently limits suits to those initiated up to 6 years after the violation of the Act or 3 years after the material facts of the false claim are known or (should have been known) to a government official.³⁶ But S. 386 as approved by the House of Representatives and, just last week, agreed to with minor differences³⁷ by the Senate amends the FCA to provide that if the government intervenes in a *qui tam* lawsuit, the government’s pleading “shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of the person who originally brought the action.”

This amendment effectively gives the government the ability to toll the statute of limitations without a defendant being given adequate or sufficient notice of a complaint. For example, in *United States v. Baylor University Medical Center*, the government obtained repeated extensions of the 60-day period in the FCA that a complaint remains under seal.³⁸ The FCA provides that the initial complaint and written disclosure is filed under seal in a federal court in order to give the government 60 days to decide whether to intervene—the defendant receives no notice of the lawsuit. The government can also move for extensions of this 60-day period, during which time the complaint remains under seal.³⁹

In the *Baylor University* case, the government finally decided to intervene in the lawsuit after eight years. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the six-year statute of limitations had run because the government’s complaint did not relate back to the original date the

35. S. 386, Sec. 4(d). The proposed language gives this right to any “employee, government contractor, or agent.” *Id.*

36. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b).

37. Before S. 386 could be enacted into law, the differences in the House and Senate bills would still have to be ironed out.

38. 469 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006).

39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).

lawsuit was filed.⁴⁰ As the court noted in discussing a federal rule of civil procedure on this issue, the “touchstone for relation back...is notice, i.e., whether the original pleading gave a party ‘adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence that forms the basis of the claim or defense.’” Since the “under seal” requirement of the FCA prevents a defendant from having any notice at all, “any relation back of subsequent filings to the original complaint is incompatible with the core requirement of notice...[and] continued running of the statute of limitations is warranted.”⁴¹

A fundamental purpose of any statute of limitations is to encourage cases to be brought when evidence is still fresh. Over time, witnesses move, fall out of contact, die, and simply forget important facts. Statutes of limitations also reduce the costs and burden of litigation. It almost always becomes more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming for a defendant to find documents and other related information for alleged violations of the law the older the events are and the further in the past the supposed violations occurred. The amendment in S.386 violates the fundamental requirements of fairness and due process that a defendant be given adequate notice of a claim. The government should not have the ability to stretch out the statute of limitations through a relations-back doctrine while a defendant’s ability to defend himself deteriorates and the government’s possible losses—and a *qui tam* plaintiff’s potential award—pile up.

Conclusion

Regardless of what the drafters’ intentions might have been, from start to finish S. 386 is a bill crafted to expand the ability of individual plaintiffs and trial

lawyers to use False Claims Act litigation not to protect the American taxpayer, but as an all-purpose punitive fraud statute against private industry and nonprofit organizations. *Qui tam* plaintiffs are considered to be acting as “private attorneys general,” which is problematic given that a “private attorney general is understood to be someone who is suing on behalf of the public, but doing so on his own initiative, with no accountability to the government or the electorate.”⁴² The existing provisions of the FCA attempt to strike a balance between the benefits of allowing private attorneys general to develop fraud claims otherwise unknown to the government and the great potential for abuse by such private attorneys general.⁴³

The provisions of S. 386 dispense with that balance and throw open the door to new classes of frivolous and unscrupulous litigation for personal gain, ostensibly for the benefit of the government but controlled by plaintiffs and their trial lawyers. Given the current recession, when the costs of abusive litigation to our economy are even more important, it makes no sense to increase the number of lawsuits or to use the coercive law enforcement power of the government for the aid of private parties when there is virtually no evidence that more litigation is needed and no safeguards are in place to prevent misuse of such law enforcement authority. Congress and the President should not create new and unnecessary litigation claims for the benefit of trial lawyers, which serve to undermine the U.S. economy and expose private parties to expanded liability and more frivolous and vexatious litigation.

40. 469 F.3d at 265.

41. 469 F.3d at 270. Similarly, in another case, the original complaint was filed in 1996 yet the government waited until 2003 to intervene in the lawsuit. See *United States ex rel. Health Outcomes Technologies v. Hallmark Health System, Inc.*, 409 F.Supp.2d 43 (D. Mass. 2006).

42. Jeremy A. Rabkin, *The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General*, 61 *Law & Contemporary Problems* 179, 179 (Winter 1998) (emphasis added).

43. See *United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn*, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The history of the FCA *qui tam* provisions demonstrates repeated congressional efforts to walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing and encouraging opportunistic behavior.”).