U.S., South Korea Reverse Plan to Turn Over Military Command

Washington and Seoul wisely decided during senior-level military talks on October 23 to abandon a 2007 plan to dissolve the existing allied military command structure on the Korean Peninsula. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and South Korean Minister of Defense Han Min-koo agreed to postpone indefinitely the planned return of wartime operational control (OPCON) of the South Korean military to Seoul.

Highlighting the growing North Korean nuclear threat, the U.S. and South Korea declined to set a new deadline, instead adopting a conditions-based approach for “when critical ROK [South Korea] and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON [operational control] transition.”

Currently, if hostilities break out between North Korea and South Korea, South Korea would place all of its military forces under OPCON of the bilateral Combined Forces Command (CFC), which is led by a U.S. general. But in 2007, the U.S. agreed to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s request that Washington return wartime OPCON of South Korean military forces by 2012 (later delayed until 2015).

The progressive Roh, who during his 2002 campaign for president declared, “[W]hat’s wrong with being anti-American?,” saw attaining wartime OPCON as a means of regaining ROK national sovereignty and pride by “overcoming the nation’s psychological dependence on the United States.”

The bilateral agreement, reversed by yesterday’s decision, would have dissolved the CFC and replaced it with two parallel national commands separately controlling each nation’s forces during hostilities with North Korea. As The Heritage Foundation has warned since 2008, the plan to dissolve Combined Forces Command was ill-advised and potentially dangerous during hostilities. Unity of command and control is an incontrovertible and timeless feature of smart military planning.

The Heritage Foundation instead recommended that the U.S. and South Korea should retain the combined command structure and continue to assess the potential for Seoul eventually assuming command of the CFC with the U.S. as deputy commander.

Since the 2007 plan was adopted, Washington and Seoul had become so fixated on the deadline for transferring OPCON as to be distracted from ensuring robust combined and integrated allied capabilities to deter and defeat the North Korean military threat. The focus on the OPCON transition had also led South Korea to waste money on duplicating capabilities that the alliance already possessed under the old command arrangements.

Retaining the CFC was a wise decision since the command has been built up over 60 years to provide maximum allied deterrent and warfighting capabilities. However, the allies should not become complacent. Seoul and Washington should now focus on ensuring robust combined and integrated allied capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat the North Korean military threat.

Washington should reverse draconian cuts to its defense budget which have already negatively impacted U.S. forces worldwide. For its part, South Korea needs to address defense shortfalls by committing to acquiring necessary defense capabilities, including a more effective missile defense system. To date, Seoul has insisted on a less effective means to defend its citizens against North Korean nuclear weapons, apparently out of concern of aggravating China.